Taiwan Puts Bitcoin on the Reserve Agenda as Premier Seeks Year-End Review and Seized-Coin Audit
Taiwan debates adding Bitcoin to reserves. Premier Cho orders an updated assessment and a full audit of confiscated coins as the island weighs USD exposure and long-term strategy.

Because Bitcoin
November 13, 2025
Taiwan’s reserve policy just moved from theory to homework. A lawmaker’s push to evaluate Bitcoin alongside traditional assets has prompted a government commitment to deliver two concrete outputs this year: a refreshed analysis of Bitcoin as a reserve asset and a comprehensive audit of confiscated coins sitting in government custody.
The flashpoint came during a Legislative Yuan financial inquiry this week. Taiwan People’s Party legislator Ge Rujun urged a rethink of digital assets through the lens of national security and financial sovereignty, not just speculation. After Central Bank Governor Yang Chin-long suggested that 2030 remains a distant horizon, Ge pressed whether Taiwan can afford to defer decisions in a rapidly changing landscape. Ge also criticized what they described as an overly cautious stance and argued that, if fiscal conditions are not strained, authorities should consider retaining seized virtual assets rather than rushing to liquidate them.
Premier Cho Jung-tai closed the session by directing officials to publish, before year-end, an updated reserve study that includes Bitcoin and a full inventory of government-held Bitcoin tied to ongoing criminal cases. The debate follows a September note from Deutsche Bank’s research arm projecting that by 2030 there could be room for both gold and Bitcoin on central bank balance sheets. Taiwan’s foreign-exchange reserves were roughly $600 billion at the end of October, according to central bank data, with more than 80% reportedly in U.S. Treasuries. The Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s unicameral parliament, has become the stage for what increasingly looks like a broader strategy review.
One issue deserves special focus: concentration risk. Taiwan is effectively long the U.S. dollar through its vast Treasury holdings while also tethered to China’s economic cycle via trade and supply chains. Bonnie Chang, who runs the largest Chinese-language Bitcoin and crypto channel on YouTube, framed the debate as a recognition that the global center of gravity has shifted from hardware to software, AI, and digital financial rails. For an economy known as the hardware backbone of the world, the question is less about chasing Bitcoin’s price and more about whether the reserve mix should reflect that structural shift and diversify exposure.
A credible path forward does not require a leap—it requires instrumentation. If authorities are to even test Bitcoin’s fit, they need operational clarity well before allocation: - Inventory integrity: a chain-of-custody audit of confiscated Bitcoin, with on-chain proof and public reporting, would establish a baseline of trust. The audit should segregate case-related coins from any potential treasury holdings to avoid commingling. - Custody and governance: a multisig framework with domestic oversight and independent auditors reduces single-point risk. Clear key ceremonies, disaster recovery, and role separation between law enforcement, the central bank, and the treasury are non-negotiable. - Risk limits and sizing: if pursued, any allocation should be incremental—basis points, not percentage points—framed as a pilot with predefined thresholds for market stress, liquidity, and correlation behavior versus USD assets. - Policy clarity: treatment of seized BTC needs rules that balance justice and taxpayer value—when to sell, when to hold, and how to handle market impact—so that courtroom outcomes do not dictate portfolio outcomes.
The technology is the easy part; the psychology is not. Public reaction in Taiwan tends to be polarized, colored by the memory of scams and high-profile frauds. That history can overshadow policy discussions unless the process is radically transparent. Publishing the seized-coin inventory, committing to quarterly disclosures, and separating a potential reserve pilot from enforcement recoveries would help show that this is about sovereign risk management, not a speculative bet.
From a business standpoint, Bitcoin’s volatility is the headline, but the deeper question is covariance. If an asset’s return drivers differ meaningfully from U.S. rates and China’s cycle, even a small slice can improve the overall risk-adjusted profile of reserves. A pilot can quantify that without putting core liquidity at risk. Deutsche Bank’s 2030 framing gives policymakers time—but not a reason to wait to build the capabilities.
There is also a governance dimension. Treating on-chain assets with the same rigor applied to gold or foreign bonds—valuation policies, audit standards, and ethical guidelines around confiscations—signals institutional maturity. That matters for market confidence and for Taiwan’s positioning in digital finance, especially as jurisdictions experiment with tokenized markets and programmable settlement.
This debate is not about declaring Bitcoin a panacea. It is about whether a dollar-heavy reserve and a China-linked trade exposure warrant a measured exploration of an uncorrelated, programmatically scarce asset—and whether the state can manage it with professional-grade controls. Taiwan has the technical talent to do this well. The year-end reports Premier Cho requested—the reserve assessment and the seized-coin inventory—will show whether it also has the institutional will.
